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Refugee Youth Resettlement: Historicizing Policies of Deradicalization and Resiliency

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ABSTRACT

This article traces the evolution of the concepts of radicalization and deradicalization, specifically as they pertain to the social category of youth. It aims to locate and understand the concept of 'resiliency' as a deradicalization method and map out resiliency agendas in relation to the settlement of refugee youth. This article sets out to understand the relationship between deradicalization narratives and refugee youth resettlement programs within a broader historical and contemporary socio-political context.

KEYWORDS

Refugee youth; youth; resettlement; radicalization; deradicalization; resilience; resiliency; September 11; terrorism; Middle East and North Africa; national cohesion;

I belong there. I have many memories. I was born as everyone is born.
I have a mother, a house with many windows, brothers, friends, and a prison cell
With a chilly window! I have a wave snatched by seagulls, a panorama of my own.
…I have lived on the land long before swords turned man into prey.
…I have learned and dismantled all the words in order to draw from them a single word: Home.
(Darwish, 2013, p. 28)

Introduction

In this moment, the world is in the throes of experiencing the highest levels of human displacement ever recorded, with 26.3 million refugees, 45.7 million asylum seekers, and 45.7 million internally displaced persons (UNHCR, n.d., a), at least half of whom are under the age of 18 (UNHCR, n.d., b). Reasons for forced displacement are many, including war, conflict, "natural" environmental disasters expedited by extractive capitalism, and socio-political persecution. Further, the process of refugee settlement globally has changed as a result of the "protracted" nature of these events. The Syrian conflict alone has led to the displacement of 5.6 million refugees since 2011, with the highest number of resettlements in what are considered to be middle-income countries such as Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon (UNHCR, n.d., a). It seems self-evident that patterns of displacement and settlement change over time, however, these changes need to be understood "as part of historic developments" (Marfleet, 2007, p. 137) and the ways in which these patterns are shaped and shape global policies on migration and resettlement.

In thinking about displacement and resettlement, I am often reminded of the words of the late Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish. His poetry, so deeply captured the sentiments of exile and displacement, of wars, conflicts, loss, hope, and joys of an entire nation. He questioned the meanings of home and belonging. And so, in thinking about resettlement of those who have been displaced, I also often think about what it means to leave a "home" and to have to build anew. What it takes to become and be considered as part of the fabric of new "host" countries, what has to be given up and what is gained in that process. What it means for the aspirations—political and personal of young people, and how national narratives eclipse these aspirations. My own call on history in this paper is to gain a better understanding of the "resiliency agenda," as one of the current policies regarding young refugee resettlement. I aim to understand this agenda, or in other words approach to refugee resettlement, within the context of the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) or deradicalization frameworks which have been developed as a response to the events of September 11, 2001. In this paper, I aim to trace back the development of a resiliency framework in the resettlement of refugee youth, to the development of CVE policies. This article is an attempt to begin to piece together and understand the current resiliency-informed approach to refugee resettlement, as part of a larger set of historical and social relations. My hope is that this tracing will begin to locate and connect the intricacies of how a global security agenda in the aid of capital has brought into its fold a whole-societal approach to managing young people, specifically migrant and refugee youth.

I will begin by providing a brief overview of the ways in which youth have been centered and implicated as agents of peace on local, regional, and global levels. I will then sketch out a number of significant shifts in the local and global narratives of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and deradicalization. Finally, I will locate refugee youth resettlement policies within these frameworks.

This paper provides a review of some of the significant theoretical shifts in the approach to understanding terrorism and the evolution of notions of deradicalization and CVE, particularly in the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001. As well, the historical tracing I aim to provide paves a path to better understand the relationship between three seemingly disparate areas of study and social phenomena – youth policy, migration and displacement, and deradicalization and prevention of violent extremism. This article is the initiation of a conversation between these fields, and paves the ground for addressing the following questions: how does a resiliency framework for refugee resettlement create the conditions of refugee youth's politicization or de-politicization? How refugee resettlement policies shape and continue to reshape national narratives which under the guise of "social" and "community cohesion" come to the aide of empire and capital's security agenda? And ultimately, how does the resettlement of young refugees through a resiliency framework contribute to their sense of integration and belonging in Canadian society? While I do not answer any of these questions in this paper, I hope to provide the historical groundwork to begin to answer them.

Background and Context

As the world experiences accelerated mass migration, preoccupations about the integration of refugees—and refugee youth in particular—feature prominently in immigration and resettlement policies on both national and international levels. As well, the international security framework has directed its attention and resources to the role of youth, particularly those from the Global South, in the maintenance of global and regional peace and security. Numerous policies, programs, and funding have been dedicated to the management of young people for the benefit of global security (Sukarieh & Tannock 2018; Williams 2016). Central to these security narratives are approaches of CVE and deradicalization in which a resiliency framework features prominently. At the same time, a resiliency framework has become a common approach for the resettlement of refugees, particularly in and from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region as a way to mitigate the perceived negative impact of young refugees on the fabric of their host nations, to counteract the potential of radicalization, and to lessen their burden on host countries. This framework of resiliency as a CVE approach can be traced back to as early as 2004, targeting predominantly young Muslim men in Europe (Kundnani & Hayes, 2018).

Over the course of the past three decades, "youth" as a social category has taken center stage in many global and international policies. These policies and agendas have developed and continue to be against a backdrop of an environment that Giroux (2009) refers to as a "War on Youth," akin to a militarized affront. These global and regional policies on youth range across different United Nations (UN), and aid and development agencies. While they all focus on the important role that youth play in society, some focus on the challenges faced by youth, others on their political and economic participation, youth employment, and youth's role in global peace. The first United Nations youth-related resolution was established in 1965 titled "Declaration on the Promotion among Youth of the Ideals of Peace, Mutual Respect and Understanding between Peoples." Later, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) declared 1985 as International Youth Year with the themes of participation, development and peace, as a way of drawing attention to both the problems and aspirations of youth (UN International Years). In 1998, the UN implemented an International Youth Day to "celebrate the potential of youth as partners in today's global society (United Nations)." In

1995 the UN implemented a World Program of Action for Youth, a biennial *World Youth Report* in 2003, an Inter-Agency Network on Youth Development in 2010, and a UN Envoy for Youth in 2013. Outside of the UN, other international organizations have been following a similar trend. In 2001, the World Bank, in partnership with the UN and the International Labour Organization (ILO) formed a global Youth Employment Network, and in 2002, the World Bank established a Children and Youth Team, as well as a network of national Youth Advisory Groups. Later in 2004, it created the Youth to Youth Community which is a network of young World Bank staff members, followed by an interactive youth website called *Youthink!* in 2006, and the dedication of its 2007 *World Development Report* to the condition of the world's youth. As well, in 2011, the World Economic Forum launched its Global Shapers Community, a network of hubs, led and developed by youth, in order to represent the "voice of youth" at different World Economic Forum events (Sukarieh & Tannock, 2015).

On the state level, in 2012, the U.S. State Department created its Office of Global Youth Issues as well as its worldwide network of Youth Councils with the aim of both "empowering" youth and "elevating" youth issues as priority in its global policies. More notably, in the same year the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) adopted its first *Policy on Youth in Development* (Sukarieh & Tannock, 2015). According to the USAID's website, the development of this policy was both "timely" and "necessary" since "more than half of the world's population today is under the age of 30, with the vast majority living in the developing world " (USAID, 2012, p. 1). In 2015, there was a visible shift in the sub-focus of global youth related policies. In this year, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace, and Security (Sukarieh & Tannock, 2018; Williams, 2016). This resolution was part of a larger set of international policies and conferences which included: the White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism (February 2015), the European Youth Against Violent Extremism Conference (June 2015), the Global Forum on Youth, Peace and Security (August 2015), the Global Youth Summit Against Violent Extremism (September 2015), and the 2016 *Arab Human Development Report* (AHDR) which focused on the "role of youth in the Arab region" (Sukarieh & Tannock 2018; AHDR, 2016). Further, youth play a central role and are identified as a main demographic for engagement in the UN's 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs – Youth). Peace and security, human rights, and sustainable development are the three main pillars of the work of the United Nations, and the aim of the Youth Strategy is to increase youth's engagement with them. Youth are recognized as positive "agents of change" who are resilient (United Nations Office of the Secretary-General's Envoy on Youth, n.d., n.p.).

Much of the frenzy of more recent youth focused policies and resolutions was foregrounded in the events of the 2011 Arab Spring in the MENA region. A wave of uprisings, referred to as the Arab Spring, called for the downfall of the region's largely Western-backed regimes. Hanieh (2013) describes the uprisings as the confrontation of millions of people with "authoritarian, corrupt, and feckless rulers, whose contempt for their populations has been matched by the fear of losing grip on power" (p. 1). These uprisings were grossly (mis)identified globally as predominantly youth-led, with particular emphasis on the role that digital media and platforms played in organizing the movements. This was partly informed by the region's higher than average young population (Kabbani, 2019). The emphasis on their youth-led and youth-organized nature has had significant theoretical and policy implications. The significance of framing these uprisings as youth led is a key point for analysis and

understanding of policies informed by population control frameworks such as the youth bulge theory and the demographic dividend which I will address below, while shifting focus away from the actual demands of those who rose up in the region.

Although the events of 2011 intensified the duality of looking at youth through the lens of "youth as a problem" or the "problem of youth," Catusse and Destremau (2016) argue that very little has changed with regards to state policies in the MENA region. What they observe is that given the increase in international funding, a particular understanding and definition of "youth" is becoming concretized in policies in the MENA region – one that is not nuanced and in fact highlights and augments specific tensions within the geopolitical context of each state. More specifically, it has had far-reaching consequences on gender relations in the region, as the implicit benefactors (or in other words those targeted by national youth policies) have become, more often than not, men. This focus can partially be explained through an understanding of the youth bulge theory.

The Youth Bulge

Briefly, the youth bulge theory can be understood as a successor to the notion that "overpopulation" in the global-South poses a security threat to the global-North. Incepted by Gary Fuller in 1985, it is used as a tool for identifying political unrest caused by large youth populations, specifically by men. Those who approach the youth bulge theory from a socio-biological lens believe particular male biological traits are what drive young men toward violence (Hendrixon & Hartmann, 2018). As one of the main theorizers of the youth bulge, Urdal (2006) combines theories of civil war with that of the youth bulge to conclude that there is in fact a direct and positive correlation between large young populations and political violence. Urdal (2006) makes a number of suggestions to mitigate the supposedly dangerous outcomes of a youth bulge, such as increased access to higher education, increased development, and emigration. Further, referencing the 2002 Arab Human Development Report and a report by the Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, Urdal (2006) concludes that well-educated young men are the most at risk of "terrorist agitation." Urdal (2006) bases some of his conclusions on the assumption that increased development will lead to increased peace, since it will lead to higher incomes and will have an impact on fertility and therefore change the age-structures of the population.

One of the anecdotes to the youth bulge theory offered by Urdal (2006) is the demographic dividend theory. This theory maintains that under the correct conditions, populations with a large youth demographic, can enjoy a "window of opportunity for economic development" (Urdal 2006, p. 611) *if* the fertility rates decrease *and* there is an increase in the working-age population. However, the realization of these conditions is directly contingent on the social, economic, and political environment explained by Hendrixon and Hartmann (2018) as an "increased youth education and economic policies that support free trade" (p. 611). The youth bulge theory frames the existence of a younger than global average youth population as a threat to political stability and security, and as such, a group that needs to be managed and controlled.

UN Resolutions: Youth, Peace and Security

In 2015, the United Nations identified the "essential" role played by youth in both the prevention and resolution of conflict and maintenance of peace through a first of its kind, resolution 2250 titled *Youth, Peace, and Security* (YPS) under the leadership of the Kingdom of Jordan (UNSCR, 2015; The Missing Peace Report, 2018). This was followed by resolution 2419 in 2018 and 2535 in July 2020 as the third resolution on the topic. These resolutions not only call for the protection of young people during armed conflicts and post-war reconstruction, but also highlight the crucial and "positive" role youth play in building and maintaining peace and security, and cultivating social cohesion, both regionally and globally. In fact, a progress report on these

resolutions identifies young people's work on peace and security as the "connective tissue" between fields of development, human rights, humanitarian affairs, and peace and security" (The Missing Peace, 2018, p. 52). In general, the *Youth, Peace, and Security* resolutions call for the participation and inclusion of young people in peacebuilding processes. While an in-depth discussion of these resolutions is beyond the scope of this paper, a few of their components are relevant to the topic at hand, which I will discuss here.

These resolutions highlight that the current youth population is the largest it has ever been globally, and that youth make up the majority of the population in countries impacted by armed conflict (UNSCR 2250). As such, the resolutions note, young people are also disproportionately affected by armed conflict, especially as refugees and internally displaced peoples. The resolutions also mention that under the correct conditions a young population can present a "unique demographic dividend" (p. 2) that can contribute to peace and economic well-being. In the 2018 Progress Report on Resolution 2250, organized by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), the suggestion was made that under the right conditions, with a correct harnessing of young people's potential as contributors to lasting peace and security, the "demographic dividend" can turn into a "peace dividend"(The Missing Peace Report, 2018, p. 115).

The Missing Peace Report suggests that the disruptions caused by conflict in the lives of young people, and the absence of peace can lead to "radicalization" and "violent extremism" which in turn can impact the potential of peacebuilding and instigate further violence, ultimately creating the conditions for potential terrorism. Some of the mechanisms highlighted for the prevention of violence include: social and economic development, growth of local economies, youth employment opportunities and vocational training, youth entrepreneurship, political engagement, inclusive labour policies, and public-private partnerships. Specifically, youth and women are singled out as playing an integral role in countering violent extremism that is "conducive" to terrorism. Further, the resolutions call for policies and plans that can strengthen youth resiliency. In a 2020 UN Security Council report on the YPS resolutions, marginalization and exclusion of youth from decision making processes as well as youth unemployment are identified as two key factors instigating the cycle of "political distrust" and a "challenge to systems and structures" (UNSC, 2020, p. 2) contributing to both regional and global insecurity.

While there are elements of the youth bulge theory in the YPS resolutions that consider "unmanaged" youth as a threat to global security, the resolutions for the most part take a positive approach in framing a larger youth population as one that, under the right conditions, can have a positive impact. Referred to as Positive Youth Development (PYD), this model frames youth as "assets" or "resources" that can be developed as opposed to being managed (Damon, 2004; Moore, 2017; Sukarieh & Tannock, 2015). Quite often the approach of PYD appears with the ideas of individual or community "resilience" and "potential," downplaying the significance of the structural factors and focusing on the individuals' abilities to deal with adversities and harness their potential (Arnett, 2000; Tannock & Sukarieh, 2015). These approaches are very much visible in other recent global policies and documents on youth and the MENA region. These theories also facilitate not only the framing of youth in particular ways that serve national and global interests, but as well aide the process of creating a citizenry that can help to advance neoliberal development understood as a "hegemonic system within global capitalism" (Harvey, 2007, p. 27). This is particularly evident through the emphasis of the above resolutions and reports on vocational training, entrepreneurship, and the role of youth in economic growth.[1]

[1] For a more in-depth discussion on the relationship of youth entrepreneurship programs and youth political dissent see Ritchie, G., Haghgou, S., and Mojab, S. (Forthcoming). Dissent interrupted: Settling refugee youth in Carpenter, S., Mojab, S., Ritchie, G. (Eds.), *Marxism and Migration*. Palgrave.

Further, these approaches help to frame particular historical moments, such as the Arab Spring, in ways that are disconnected and dehistoricized from the actual conditions which led so many to the streets in 2011. These analytical approaches in the framing of youth as a social category, as well as policies and resolutions related to youth, demonstrate the global focus on youth as potential threats or gatekeepers of global security. Central to these narratives of global security, particularly as they pertain to youth, are approaches to Countering Violent Extremism and radicalization.

Shifts in CVE and Deradicalization

As mentioned, it is largely in the context of global peace and security that youth resiliency factors into the approaches proposed by the reports and resolutions outlined above. To better comprehend the resiliency approach, we must locate it within the larger narrative of deradicalization and Countering Violent Extremism. Much of the critical literature points to the events of September 11, 2001 as the impetus for the concept of radicalization as we understand it today, and as a turning point for states in cultivating a national narrative of integration and social cohesion against the threats of violent extremism (Coolsaet 2016; Kundnani, 2007, 2012; Sedgwick, 2010).

Centering youth, these narratives often rely on a resiliency framework (Neumann, 2009; Sukarieh & Tannock, 2016). In fact, Peter Neumann, the pioneer of the field of contemporary radicalization studies, defines resilience in the context of deradicalization as the "antithesis to terror" (Neumann & Smith, 2007, p. 100). Outlining a number of shifts in counterterrorism approaches and policies will aid us in better understanding the concept of radicalization, as well as how it informs a resiliency framework. I use the term *shifts* here, rather than *breaks*, because these approaches do not offer a definitive rupture from previous frameworks of terrorism or "political violence"; rather, they are turns on the same road. Further, definitions of what constitutes *terror*, *violent extremism*, or *radicalization* remain ambiguous within the field, and these ambiguities linger through the various shifts.

Nonetheless, the changes that do occur are significant: they indicate not only the evolution of countering and preventing violent extremism but also—contextualized within the larger socio-political dynamics—help us understand the conditions of their conceptualization and implementation, ultimately to the service of the production and reproduction of the social relations of capital. These shifts also illuminate that the events of 9/11, for example, cannot be understood as the initiation of regimes of hyper surveillance and criminalization of particular groups of people, nor as the first time that national narratives were reformulated against the backdrop of the threat of disintegration of national unity, but rather what Kumar (2020) refers to as a "turning point." The framework of radicalization, or the "new terrorism," can be understood as a post 9/11 phenomena, theorized by scholars of terrorism such as Walter Laqueur (2004) and Peter Neumann (2009). This new era of terrorism is predominantly understood as "Islamic fundamentalist violence" that is less political and more innate, as compared to the "old terrorism" that was more political in nature and "inspired by nationalism, communism, or fascism" (Kundnani, 2012, p. 4) The "new terrorism" approach to understanding radicalisation suggests that individuals no longer (as they did before) belong to an organized and structured political group but instead are "radicalized into supporting an "ideology" as part of an informal social network" (Kundani, 2012, p. 12).

Scholars of radicalization (Kundnani, 2012; Pressman, 2008; Sedgwick, 2010) argue that the current framework entails an approach of national integration, predominantly in Western Europe, and less so in Canada and the United States. This idea of integration and desegregation focuses on aspects such "residential and labour-market segregation" (Sedgwick, 2010, p. 486) as a form of violence prevention, not too dissimilar from new approaches to refugee integration. Further, there are a number of nations and regions that have played a fundamental role in the development and implementation of countering and preventing violent extremism frameworks, and have each at one point or another been the leading figure in the field. They include the UK, the European Union, and the United States. That is to say that while there have been periods of divergence in their individual approaches to the issue, ultimately their policies have come to mirror one another.

Referencing a bibliographic study of the field of terrorism, Stampnitzky (2013) states that the study of terrorism, in the way that it is understood today as a form of "political violence," began in 1973. It is at this point that another shift, from the concept of (counter)insurgency to (counter)terrorism begins to take shape—although counterinsurgency remains to play a crucial role in U.S. foreign relations strategies. Kumar (2020) contextualizes the period of the late 1960s through to the 1970s as a moment of "empire in crisis," defined by the "the Vietnam War, declining U.S. economic hegemony, the rise of Third World Nationalism, and the radicalisation of the anti-war and civil rights movements" (p. 35), as well as the events of the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979. It is in this environment, Kumar (2020) argues, that threats, domestic and global in nature, were understood through the U.S. counterinsurgency framework. Further, the first neoliberal project in place in Chile "set the stage for a new era of capitalist renewal" (Kumar, 2020, p. 39) that was contingent on the management of dissent as well as a "logic of security."

This logic understood that in order for "capitalism to thrive" it was dependent on security and global stability. Counterinsurgency, a form of conflict understood as "a partnership between 'governments, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and the private sector'" (Khalili, 2011, p. 1472) at the time ensured and continues to ensure the United States' imperial agenda. This was, of course, met by dissent both inside the U.S. and globally, and on the international level, in part, brought the U.S. and Israel closer together in fighting a common enemy—the Arab terrorist (Kumar, 2020). It is as well at this time that there began to be a shift, or a desire to shift the definition of terrorism to focus on people and not necessarily states (for a detailed discussion on this history, specifically the key role of the Jonathan Institute Conferences, see Kumar, 2020). However, this process, as Kumar (2020) points out, was not without its contradictions.

On the global level, in 1973, the UNSC passed Resolution 3070 titled *Importance of the universal realization of the right of people to self-determination and of the speedy granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples for the effective guarantee and observance of human right (reference doc)*, which reaffirmed the people's right to struggle for liberation including through "armed struggle" (Kumar, 2020; United Nations General Assembly). Earlier in 1972, in a White House Memo and later in 1976 in a speech by the head of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism (CCCT), it was outlined that "common crimes, internal political disputes, civil strife, decolonization, bi-national or international armed conflict" (p. 26) were outside of the realm of U.S. "campaign against international terrorism," with only a concern for the "spread of violence to persons and places far removed from the scene of struggles for self-determination" (as cited in Stampnitzky, 2013, p. 26), or a "spilling over" of violence. In much the same way that the events of September 11, 2001 ushered in a new conversation around terrorism and radicalization, the massacre at the Munich Olympics in 1972 is identified as the "inaugurating" event of "modern terrorism" (Kumar 2020; Stampnitzky 2013).

Post 9/11 Shift

The events of September 11, catalyzed a shift away from the idea of *terrorism* and *radicalism* to *radicalization*, in order to understand the "cultural-psychological disposition" leading to violence (Kundnani, 2012). This shift to radicalization or Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) as referred to in the European Union and the United States respectively, has had a number of important implications for policy and practice: it has catalyzed the shift away from understanding how terrorism occurs to why terrorism occurs, or rather the "root causes" of terrorism; it has led to a focus on the individual, their circumstances, and ideology, at the expense of depoliticizing and obscuring the larger context and conditions leading to violence; it has shifted focus to prevention and preemptive approaches to violence; broadened the reach of the state security agenda by involving different state and non-state sectors in the process of identifying and pre-empting violence; and more explicitly brought into its fold national narratives and mechanisms of "integration" and "prevention of segregation" as approaches in deradicalization (Coolsaet, 2016; Kundnani 2007, 2012; Laqueur, 1987; Neumann, 2008; Pressman, 2008; Revell, 2018; Sedgwick 2010).

The initiation of CVE or deradicalization approaches and policies can be traced back to Amsterdam in 2004. At the time, the city aimed to implement a system that could detect signs of radicalization of young Muslims early-on, in order to intervene. This new approach did not aim to intervene in active cases of violence

but rather wanted to pre-empt the violence of those who, although had expressed lawful political and religious views, were perceived to be a threat (Coolsaet, 2016; Kundnani & Hayes, 2018). The underlying assumption was that if youth were identified in that *early* stage, then through an intervention they could cultivate a capacity to become resilient against radicalization. This was the beginning of CVE as a pre-emptive mechanism to terror and violence. This approach also entailed the cultivation of an intricate and complex set of extended relationships with different institutions and state agencies in order to gather the necessary information to identify signs of radicalization (Kundnani & Hayes, 2018).

In the framework of radicalization, particular kinds of ideology were identified as the "cause of terrorism" and young people as the vessels for enacting those ideologies. In 2004, the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) was the first organization in the West to identify and describe radicalization as an ideological process that had the possibility of developing "autonomously in Western countries without the involvement of a recruiting organization" (Kundnani & Hayes, 2018, p. 5) or particular social and political circumstances. It should be noted that almost a decade later, the AIVD declared that the mechanism of profiling and identifying indicators had been only of "limited use" (Coolsaet, 2016, p. 5).

What initiated in the Netherlands arrived in Britain shortly after in 2005, signalling a shift toward focusing on "attitudes, mindsets, and dispositions" (Kundnani & Hayes, 2018, p. 7) and away from understanding organizations, institutions, and movements as sources of terror. This shift toward considering different sources of radicalization, mostly focused on Islamic ideology, which by then was believed to not spread through recruitment, but rather ideologically radicalised young people toward violent extremism. In the UK, this led to the creation of the Prevent Program that was the first of its kind in scope and its demands from society at large (Thomas, 2016, 2018). In the context of the UK, Miller (2018) argues that over the past two decades, public discourse and legislation on topics of racism and ethnic minority relations have transformed into that of "community cohesion," later to "preventing violent extremism" and ultimately into the Prevent Program.

The events of September 11 facilitated the switch from social or community cohesion to "preventing violent extremism" and Miller (2018) suggests that the concept of "community cohesion" as a national policy in the UK was "predicated" on that of "parallel lives" that identified self-segregation as a factor in the division of people of "different communities" from the nation as a whole. In fact, Kundnani (2007) argued that after the events of 7/7 in London, the UK's government strategy was to develop a national narrative to demonstrate how "a set of core values were embedded in what it meant to be British" (p. 25) which went on to create benchmarks against which different categories of migration and legitimacy of immigrant groups could be assessed. In 2005, there was also a shift in the approach to counter-terrorism in the United States. Four years after the launch of its Global War on Terror, the United States adopted a "strategy against violent extremism" (Kundnani & Hayes, 2018, p. 4) which indicated a policy move away from a focus on Al-Qaeda to a broader problem of support for "radical Islam" in the "Muslim world." CVE, often understood as a softer approach to the militarized responses to terror was meant to enable the "possibility of a long-term and holistic solution to terrorism" (Kundani & Hayes, 2018, p. 3). This "softer" approach by the United States was also a step toward realigning their policies with the European Union who had adapted a CVE approach shortly after 9/11 and had become distanced from the U.S. military approach of "shock and awe." As Kundnani and Hayes (2018) and Khalili (2011) suggest, by 2005 both the United States and the EU had aligned in a "hearts and minds" approach versus the "shock and awe" of the U.S. military response after the events of 9/11. The adoption of this approach was also conceived as a response to the idea of "home-grown terrorism."

Young Refugees and Resilience

Another notable shift, this time in the field of refugee resettlement, is the approach of long-term integration of refugees into the fabrics of host countries. This is a distinct departure from the policies of the 1990s, particularly in the EU, that focused more on the repatriation of refugees and in fact discouraged labor-market integration for that reason. This shift can be attributed to the increase in what is referred to as "protracted situations" defined as one where "25,000 or more people have been exiled for 5 years or more"

(Parkes & Pauwels, 2017, p. 2). One of the other perceived consequences of the lack of integration of refugees, and protracted habitation in camps, is the potential of radicalization (Suede, Stebbins, & Weilant, 2015). Although at least one report suggests that there is little evidence to indicate that there is a distinct difference between the radicalization of refugee youth and others (Suede, Stebbins, & Weilant, 2015).

A resilience informed agenda for refugee resettlement has gained momentum as a response to the protracted refugee crisis resulting from ongoing conflict in Syria, which is identified as not only a humanitarian and development crisis, but as well as the "most serious threat to regional peace and security" (3RP, 2015-2016, p. 6). While it is unclear when this approach was officially adopted, the Resilience Development Forum held in Jordan in 2015 appears to be one of the first times it was taken up at a global level. António Guterres (2015), at the time UN High Commissioner for Refugees, referred to a "resiliency agenda" in the keynote address of the forum. Guterres commented that resilience "is a key instrument of refugee protection" and that it is "a very important factor to allow for humanitarian action to be able to respond to the dramatic increasing humanitarian needs" of our current moment (para. 9). Commenting on the exponential rate of displacement and migration in the decade leading up to 2015, Guterres (2015) highlighted specific countries as essential for "global peace and security and for regional stability" (para. 16), including Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, as well as others neighboring Syria, along with east and central African countries. As part of the "resilience agenda," Gutteres identified these countries as those in "first priority" of development. And while some of these listed nations fall in the category of middle-income nations, Gutteres highlights UNHCR's efforts in changing policies that would make them eligible for loans and grants from the International Financial Institutions.

In that same year, the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) was launched. The 3RP is lauded as the first UN program to combine "humanitarian and development capacities, innovation, and resources" (UNHCR, n.d., c, p. 6) by bringing them together "into a single framework" (p. 8). From then on, refugee resilience can be seen not only in the work of the UNHCR but as well at the International Labour Organization (ILO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the World Food Program (WFP) among others. These organizations speak to resilient labour markets, resilience and self-reliance, resilience as a stage in building stability after a crisis, resilient coping mechanisms, and resilient development – all in relation to refugees and their host countries. Resilience is defined as the ability, individual or communal, to adapt, recover and "even" thrive in situations of adversity (UNHCR, 2016).

The UNHCR explains that refugee populations experience these adversities with greater intensity, frequency, and in more than one way. The positive adaptation that is the driving force of resilience has traditionally been defined as an intrinsic and individual characteristic evident in one's character disposition or even "genetic predisposition" (UNHCR, 2016, p. 1). However, more current research suggests that this "positive adaptation" or one's ability to cope with adversity cannot only be explained as located within the individual but as well as in the relationship between the individual and their environment. In other words, "the capacity of *both* individuals and their environments to interact in ways that optimize developmental processes" (Ungar, 2013, p. 256, emphasis in original). Resiliency then, can be "observed" in individuals who can access the resources they need in order to "flourish." However, this can only happen if the individual's "formal and informal social networks" can provide those resources. This ecological approach to understanding and cultivating resilience, tips the onus more greatly toward the availability and accessibility of resources—a "facilitative environment"—and away from placing the onus on the individual alone (Ungar, 2013). Put differently, this approach suggests attitude alone cannot cultivate resiliency. Given the conditions leading to the forced displacement of people, a significant part of this relationship—the "social and physical ecologies"—is negatively impacted. The resiliency approach, understood as a strengths-based approach is thought to be able to facilitate the transformation of experiences of adversity such as "loss of home, disrupted educational or professional plans, unstable legal status, detention, dangerous journeys, family separation…" into

opportunities for "personal growth and understanding" (UNHCR, 2016, p. 1). The ecological approach allows for these individuals to access different "capitals" in order to compensate for the adversities they have experienced and as such " transition into a peaceful and productive adult" (UNHCR, 2016, p. 2). The UNHCR outlines these capitals as: social capital, such as social relationships, and "cultural embeddedness"; human capital—the "ability to learn, play, and work" (UNHCR, 2016, p. 2); financial/institutional capital, such as healthcare, and social welfare; and environmental capital—schools, water, safe housing, etc.

Conclusion

It is hard to quantify the ongoing destruction left in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001: the War on Terror, the ensuing invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the diminishing of civil liberties in the interest of national security, to name just a few. The attacks themselves and what has followed have in many ways reshaped the way people socially and politically organize life and are organized by it on a global level, and while they may appear as a rupture in the relations of securitized capitalism, they are in fact a continuation of logics of insurgency and methods of population control, albeit intensified. Regardless of this continuity, 9/11 still marks a significant point in the evolution of theoretical and practical approaches to counterterrorism. By outlining some of the major shifts in Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and counterterrorism frameworks, I have highlighted that the current approach to deradicalization can be understood as a post 9/11 phenomena. The events of 9/11 marked a new understanding of what constitutes terrorism, and as such necessitated a new framework for countering it. The shift toward understanding the root causes of terrorism, has brought different sights of life and human activity, state and non-state institutions, and processes, into the fold of a global security agenda.

Further, by providing a historical tracing of three seemingly divergent areas of policy and global activity, I have highlighted their interconnectedness. My point is to locate the resiliency approach to young refugee resettlement, as part of a broader framework of CVE and deradicalization by arguing that this approach cannot be understood without accounting for the outlined shifts in approaches to counterterrorism that were justified through the events of September 11, 2001. These shifts and logics of security are integral to unpack and historicize in order to understand how they shape and condition the politicization of young refugees, and in turn, how young refugees become embedded in the larger logics of surveillance and control.

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